1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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241 654 437 fertilizer merchants at a loss. The merchants then transport it to the area in which that type of fertilizer is in demand; there it is sold in local feed and fertilizer shops at a slightly higher price than at the Farmers' Association.

241 437 • 65 Large numbers of farmers are affected by the results of their false claims that they will grow rice in their fields in order to be allowed to purchase fertilizer at the Farmers' Association. These false reports also affect government economic statistics. The reports made to the Farmers' Association on the amount of land surface to be planted in rice are one of the important bases used by the provincial government's Food Bureau in estimating the annual Taiwanese rice production. The official rice price mentioned earlier is determined annually by the Food Bureau according to this estimate and then is approved by the Provincial Assembly. However, since so many farmers report an intention to plant more rice than they actually intend to, the estimate regularly tends to be greater than the actual production, and as a consequence the official rice price is usually considerably lower than the market price, which is dependent upon the actual rice supply.

241 437 65 435 The difference between the official and the market prices of rice has a definite and detrimental effect on the farmers. The landowner pays a land tax for paddy land in rice which must be delivered to the Farmers' Association. In addition, the provincial government's Food Bureau requires each farmer to sell a certain amount of rice to the government at the official rice price. The additional amount of rice due is added to the land tax bill, and the farmer receives a cash payment for it at a later date. This amount of rice is directly proportional to the amount of the land tax paid in rice. Thus, for every "14.16 kilograms" (about 23.4 *chin*) of rice paid in land tax, the farmer must sell "12 kilograms" (about 19.8 *chin*) of rice to the government at the official rice price, which may be as low as 70 percent of the market price.

A number of illiterate farmers in the Hsin Hsing area do not realize that they are selling rice to the government at this lower official price. Some of them are under the impression that the money they later receive from the Food Bureau is a rebate due them because they sent in too much rice for their land tax. Apparently, no one has explained the procedure to them.

[204] Regarding this procedure, Ko Kuo-chi, a Provincial Assemblyman, in the January 1, 1958, issue of *Tzu Chih Tsa Chih, Self-Government Magazine*, sharply criticized the government's Food Bureau for the price it had decided to pay the farmers for their rice. He noted that the government was paying the farmer only NT $97.80 per 100 *chin* of rice, while on the market the farmer could obtain NT $130 for the same 100 *chin*.

The government policy has the effect of a virtual attempt to force

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changed significantly, but the villagers' attitude toward it certainly has. Today, the individual small family is becoming the most significant unit in terms of actual behavior and values.

In Hsin Hsing, internal family conflict remains a primary cause of family division, but new forces place an added strain between conjugal units. The increased pressure of population on an insufficient land base leads sons to migrate to the city to work, and the increased economic value this gives the sons weakens the father-son tie and generally speeds up the undermining of the father's authority. Women have greater economic importance now; this frequently leads to delayed marriage. A girl upon marriage is thus older and more mature, which tends to weaken her mother-in-law's authority over her. And as the authority of the elders weakens, the tie between husband and wife is strengthened. Add to this a growing demand for widely available material goods, and we can easily see the potential these factors contain for independence of the conjugal unit, a potential which has undoubtedly had an important bearing on family division.

At the same time, the increasingly greater impingement by the government on the local area has created forces which further family division. The conscription of men, land reform, and taxation, all noted in Chapters 4 and 5, have made it beneficial for families to divide. While it is true that family division has not increased significantly, it is noteworthy that all these new factors added to the balance already weighed down by internal conflict have tipped the scales so that family division now takes place openly. There is little attempt to disguise division, and where the pressures of government impingement make it seem advantageous, divsion is almost advertised. The openness with which division now takes place might in itself yet become a new force of strain within the joint family leading to division; a habitual example can become a weighty model on which to base a demand.

The significance of such demands by the small family unit for independence from the restraints of the larger joint family does not, however, imply an analogous call for independence from their more loosely organized and less demanding large kinship group or *tsu*. This has never been the case in Hsin Hsing nor, for that matter, in mainland China generally, according to most of the ethnographies. The villagers continue to lean on their *tsu* or other smaller and less organized patrilineal kin groups for many activities and functions, since they are the only basic groupings with which villagers maintain continuous, uniform, stable relations. This larger group is the sociopolitical organization most likely to work in their and their entire family's behalf over the years.

However, the villagers also feel a certain amount of socioeconomic need and desire for relations with non-kin villagers and outsiders,